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How does subjective well-being evolve with age? A literature review 
 
Well-being is supposed to be both the ultimate goal of public policy and what 
individuals strive for. In the current context of rapidly aging societies, however, the 
development of well-being as age increases suggests a particularly interesting 
research agenda relevant not only to policymakers but to all sectors of society. Even 
though much has been written about the relation between ageing and well-being, this 
issue continues to be a source of debate among scholars, politicians and the media 
(see, for example, The Economist, 2010). Although researchers have tried to identify 
patterns of well-being across the lifecycle, they have reached different, and 
sometimes even contradictory, conclusions. 
 
The purpose of our paper is to describe the mainstream theories on the relation 
between ageing and well-being from the perspectives of economics, psychology and 
gerontology and to provide a discussion of the empirical studies on this topic. The 
primary focus of the paper is the effect that age (or ageing) has on subjective well-
being (SWB), a factor whose measurement and definition is an extensive research 
topic in itself and the subject of a wealth of literature that ranges across disciplines 
and decades. One of the most general interpretations of SWB is that of Diener et al. 
(1985) who define it as “all of the various types of evaluations, both positive and 
negative, that people make of their lives” (p. 51), encompassing “cognitive 
evaluations of one’s life, happiness, satisfaction, positive emotions such as joy and 
pride, and negative emotions such as pain and worry” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p.15). It 
therefore includes not only rational valuations of a person’s life circumstances (e.g. 
satisfaction) but also emotions, which are more difficult to assess and compare. In 
this paper, we use the term SWB rather eclectically and refrain from providing or 
adhering to a precise definition. In this review we also cover a few more recent 
studies that use “less-subjective” well-being measures to corroborate the more 
traditional well-being measures used to determine SWB. 
  
The first section of this paper presents a conceptual background that includes 
economic, psychological and gerontological theories about the relation between well-
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being and age. Section two then gives an overview of some of the most relevant 
empirical findings on this issue, and section three discusses the main conclusions 
that can be drawn from this review. 
  
 
1 Conceptual frameworks 
 
Experts in the social sciences have developed various theories that attempt to 
determine a life-time pattern of well-being. Because of well-being’s multidimensional 
nature, however, the approach to understanding its relation with age varies among 
disciplines. Nonetheless, there does seem to be some theoretical convergence, at 
least in terms of findings, across such fields as economics, psychology and 
gerontology. In these areas, different approaches have produced theories that have 
more in common than is apparent at first glance.  
 
Insights from economics  
 
The social science of economics, which, at its most general analyses how economies 
work, is often seen as having a focus on growth. In reality, however, rather than 
focusing on growth per se, it views growth as a means of increasing social welfare. In 
the words of Oswald (1997, p. 2): “Economic performance is not intrinsically 
interesting. No-one is concerned in a genuine sense about the level of gross national 
product last year or about next year's exchange rate. [...] The relevance of economic 
performance is that it may be a means to an end. That end is not the consumption of 
beefburgers, nor the accumulation of television sets, nor the vanquishing of some 
high level of interest rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind's feeling of well-
being”. (p. 2)  
 
By definition, economics deals with that part of individual and social action that is 
most closely connected with the attainment and use of material requisites of well-
being Marshall (1997). Therefore, to produce measurable results, economics has 
traditionally focused on pecuniary resources, their deployment, and their distribution 
and contribution to well-being. 
4 
 
 
Above all, economics deals with utility. It thus assumes that an increase in 
consumption, income or GDP inherently increases welfare. Thus, the maxim “more is 
better” is common in the field. Utility, however, cannot be directly observed, so 
economists focus on analysing individual behaviors, such as consumption patterns, 
to infer welfare increases or decreases. Rational individuals, they believe, will try to 
maximise their consumption of goods and services subject to wealth constraints. 
Theoretically, therefore, under some key assumptions, economists should be able to 
predict the lifecycle pattern of well-being by solving the typical utility maximisation 
problem using lifetime constraints. This standard approach is known as lifecycle 
theory. 
 
Lifecycle theory has received much attention from economists since Fisher (1930) 
first suggested a linkage between consumption plans and income expectations. 
Later, this linkage was enhanced by the concept of “hump saving,” the idea that 
individuals would give up consumption in the present to save for future consumption, 
most particularly for retirement. The model was then more generally adapted for the 
prediction of savings, consumption and labor supply across the lifespan (Modigliani 
and Brumberg, 1954).  
 
The lifecycle model argues that, in making their consumption decisions, individuals 
consider not only their current income, but also their income expectations over their 
entire lifecycle, from childhood to retirement. Lifetime utility is thus an aggregation of 
instantaneous utilities, which depend on consumption at that instant (i.e. at a specific 
age). In its most strict application, the theory assumes that planned consumption is a 
function of lifetime wealth plus some parameters for age and tastes. According to this 
theory, maximisation of lifetime utility requires that the well-being gain associated 
with the consumption of an additional unit (the so-called marginal utility of 
consumption) should be the same in all periods. How consumption, and thus well-
being, changes over the lifespan depends on the nature of the utility functions. If as is 
often done in standard microeconomic models one assumes that the utility function is 
additively separable in terms of consumption and age (i.e. it has the form utility = 
v(age) + u(consumption)), then it can be easily shown that individuals would choose 
constant consumption throughout their lives, a process known as consumption 
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smoothing. Lifetime utility or well-being would then be independent of age and 
therefore flat across the lifespan. Note that this form of utility function assumes that 
the utility of consumption is independent of age (i.e. the function u does not depend 
on age).  
 
Very little empirical evidence supports the lifecycle theory that, in its simplest form, 
posits consumption smoothing, which has led some authors to argue that there is no 
reason to assume that utility of consumption must be independent of age. An 
alternative, therefore, is to relax this assumption that the marginal utility of 
consumption is independent of age. As pointed out by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2008, p. 1735), “There seems no reason why the marginal utility of consumption 
would be independent of a person’s age. One might believe that young people wish 
to signal their status to obtain mates, and, therefore, might have a greater return from 
units of consumption than the old […] Alternatively, older people may have more 
need of health and medical spending, so the marginal utility of consumption is 
greatest in old age.” If one relaxed this assumption, then consumers would adapt 
their consumption to periods in which the utility they receive from consuming is 
higher. Consumption and thus well-being would then vary across the lifespan.  
 
One leading economist in the area of life satisfaction and ageing is Richard Easterlin, 
whose findings initially supported the idea that happiness is essentially flat 
throughout the lifecycle. The socio-economic principle he proposed at that time (now 
known as the Easterlin paradox) maintains that economic growth, measured in per 
capita income, does not ultimately translate into increased well-being because 
people adapt to better life situations relatively quickly. Besides claiming that his 
results prove “the adaptability of mankind,” Easterlin (1974) also quoted George 
Homans’ dictum that “any satisfied desire creates an unsatisfied one” (p. 119).  
 
Well-being, Easterlin therefore posited, is only slightly increased if an individual’s 
income is raised relatively to the incomes of others. This point was further explained 
by economists Frey and Stutzer’s (2002) aspiration level theory, which argues for a 
strong correlation between increases in income and rises in aspiration levels. Human 
beings, the authors contend, are constantly comparing their current situation to past 
situations and their expectations of the future. In improved circumstances, they 
6 
 
rapidly adapt their expectations and are therefore less happy in the long run. In Frey 
and Stutzer’s own words, “[a] rise in our income initially provides a surge of 
satisfaction, but after some time we get accustomed to it and are not happier than 
before” (ibid., p. 78). As a result, higher levels of well-being are often transitory 
across the lifespan. 
 
The idea that well-being is relatively smooth along the lifespan has also found 
detractors in the realm of economics. Indeed, it seems tenuous to believe that 
individuals are equally happy regardless of the conditions in which they live. Easterlin 
(2005) himself reassessed his earlier findings and proposed that happiness depends 
on two types of factors: pecuniary and non-pecuniary. Pecuniary factors are those to 
which people can completely adapt, like income; non-pecuniary factors are those 
that, like marriage, disability, and long-term unemployment, can cause long-term 
changes in the individual’s well-being. The effects of such changes are examined in 
Clark et al.’s (2004) study of the effects of long-term unemployment on life 
satisfaction, which indeed found that individuals did not return to their original level of 
well-being after this type of change.  
 
The fact that economic models can be manipulated to include extra assumptions, 
which can in turn change the observed shape of a lifetime satisfaction curve, allows 
for contrasting conclusions. Indeed, it seems that “economic theory leaves open 
room for every structure of well-being over age” (van Landeghem, 2008, p. 4), and 
that “textbook economic analysis is not capable […] of producing unambiguous 
predictions about the pattern of well-being through life” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2008, p. 6). 
 
Insights from psychology 
 
In recent years, one branch of psychology, which focuses on analysing life 
satisfaction and well-being across the lifespan, has contributed important insights to 
this discussion. Much attention has been given in psychology to the set point theory, 
which argues that individuals are born with a predisposition to a certain level of 
happiness, based on genetics and personality. Even life-changing events, such as 
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marriage or the death of a loved one, only have temporary effects on the individual’s 
life satisfaction, which after a while will return to the original, biologically-determined 
level. This process, called hedonic adaptation, is defined as “the process by which 
individuals return to baseline levels of happiness following a change in life 
circumstances” (Lucas, 2007, p. 75). Even as early as 1999, Diener and Lucas 
(1999, p. 227) argued that “the influence of genetics and personality suggests a limit 
on the degree to which policy can increase subjective well-being […] Changes in the 
environment, although important for short-term well-being, lose salience over time 
through processes of adaptation, and have small effects on long-term subjective well-
being”. Therefore, all individuals in society have different but stable levels of well-
being, which are not supposed to change across the lifespan.  
 
Many psychological studies seem to support this theory, which was initially set out by 
psychologists Brickman and Campbell in the 1970s (see Campbell et al., 1976). 
Originally, these scholars’ research aimed at understanding why groups of people 
with very different access to resources (i.e. very rich people and very poor people) 
seemed to have similar levels of happiness. To explain this phenomenon, they 
developed the adaptation-level theory of well-being and proposed what is now known 
as the hedonic treadmill or hedonic adaptation theory (Kahneman, 1999). According 
to this perspective, even after major life events like winning the lottery or becoming 
paraplegic, individuals return to a ‘baseline’ level of well-being (Brickman et. al., 
1978; Kahneman, 1999). This theoretical framework was then complemented by 
Costa and McCrae’s (1980) personality theory of well-being, which specified that 
individuals are born with certain personality traits that do not change significantly 
across the lifespan. Supporting research by Myers and Diener (1996, p. 54) found, 
for instance, that “the even distribution of happiness cuts across almost all 
demographic classifications of age, economic class, race, and educational level” and 
that “happiness does not appear to depend significantly on external circumstances”. 
 
To further explore the hereditary aspect of happiness, Lykken and Tellegen (1996) 
analysed the lives, personality traits and reported well-being of twins. Their findings 
seemed to confirm that hereditary characteristics are very strong determinants of life 
satisfaction, accounting for 50% of the variance in well-being. In further studies, 
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Lykken (2000) even concluded that close to 100% of the variance in well-being can 
be accounted for by hereditary traits. 
 
The field of genoeconomics, a new field of study based on this research, has recently 
emerged to combine genetics and economics to explore and better understand 
decision-making processes and their inheritability, especially economics-related 
decisions and traits. One underlying motivation for this research is that behavioural 
geneticists have produced a “compelling array of evidence that there is genetic 
variance in economic behaviors, outcomes, and preferences” (Beauchamp et al., 
2011, p. 59). Most of these studies are based on twins and siblings because 
researchers are better able to control for genetic and environmental conditions.  
        
Important evidence for set-point theory was delivered by De Neve et al. (2010), who 
showed that individuals do indeed “exhibit a baseline level of happiness”. 
Specifically, these researchers illustrated that individuals with a longer version of the 
serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) tended to report higher levels of happiness 
(ibid.). In fact, their study, which used twins and genetic associations, showed that 
around 33% of the variation in self-reported well-being is genetically explicable. 
Conversely, even though demographic variables like socio-economic status, income, 
marriage, education and religiosity are significantly associated with individual 
happiness, no demographic variable typically accounts for more than 3% of the 
variation in self-reported well-being (Frey, 2008).  
 
According to psychologist Richard Lucas, there are three main arguments in favour 
of the set-point theory of life satisfaction. First, evidence usually shows long periods 
of constant levels of life satisfaction, even under changing circumstances. In fact, up 
to 40% of the variance in life satisfaction measures is stable in periods of up to 20 
years (Lucas 2007, p. 76). Second, over 80% of the variables that determine well-
being are inheritable, which leaves only 20% of the variance accounted for by 
demographic factors (ibid.). Third, personality variables, such as “extroversion and 
neuroticism, are relatively strong predictors of happiness” (ibid.). 
 
Nevertheless, while exploring individual adaptation to major life events, Lucas also 
found some contradictory evidence; namely, that well-being levels do in fact change 
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over time and these changes appear to be permanent. The major events that 
precipitate such changes include marriage, unemployment and disability (Lucas, 
2007, pp. 76-77), similar to the findings of Easterlin. Lucas thus concluded that long-
term levels of happiness do change but still appear “moderately stable over time” 
(ibid., p. 77). Nonetheless, he emphasised that these results “do not refute the set 
point model of happiness” (ibid., p. 78). He therefore does not reject the theory but 
argues in favour of developing it further to allow for certain adaptations to life 
circumstances. 
 
Some scientists have, however, found evidence of particular circumstances that can 
have a serious effect on the path of well-being across the lifespan (Headey and 
Wearing, 1989; Headey, 2008). Among these, Winter et al. (1999) maintained that 
individuals still suffer from the consequences of divorce or marriage long after the 
event and do not return to their original level of happiness. Easterlin (2006a) also 
reported that “adverse health changes have a negative and lasting effect on 
subjective well-being” (p. 39). Likewise, Huppert (2005, p. 318), in proposing that 
individuals have emotional reactions of different magnitude that can alter well-being, 
argued for the existence of evidence “that our set point for happiness is less set than 
some have supposed”. She also showed that individuals with the same genes 
manifest different levels of life satisfaction, which argues against the hypothesis of a 
hereditary baseline level of life well-being.  
 
Insights from gerontology 
 
Gerontology, the study of ageing, has made important contributions that have 
enriched the study of well-being across the lifespan, especially with regards to the 
levels of well-being among older individuals. On an intuitive level, common sense 
dictates that well-being should decrease among older individuals, not least because 
health diminishes substantially. That is, advancing age compromises not only 
physical but also mental capabilities. On the whole, individuals are not as self-
sufficient as in their younger years. They exit the labour market and depend on fixed 
pensions that limit the amount of financial resources at their disposal, and as they 
frequently experience the death of friends and loved ones, they become more 
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socially isolated (Williams, 1977). Yet, according to much gerontological research, 
“well-being seems to be unaffected by the adverse contexts brought on by the ageing 
process” (Mroczek and Kolarz, 1998, p. 1333). 
 
This phenomenon, known as the satisfaction paradox or “stability despite loss” 
paradox,  tries to explain the disconnect inherent in the relatively high levels of 
subjective life satisfaction reported by elderly living in objectively relatively bad 
conditions. The gerontological literature notes that this so-called paradox might be 
caused by age-cohort effects – that is, older people may report higher levels of life 
satisfaction because of the lower expectations of a particular generation (Walker, 
2005, p. 4).  
 
An alternative explanation is Charles and Carstensen’s (2009) socio-emotional 
selectivity theory, which argues that individuals experience more life satisfaction as 
age increases because, with passing time and shrinking time horizons, they spend 
more time in activities that contribute to their well-being instead of pursuing goals that 
are expected to pay off in the future. Put simply, because older people are more 
aware of mortality, they try to focus on things that contribute to their current 
happiness. As a result, older individuals have a “selective attention to the positive 
[which] might explain why [they] report the less amount of distress in day-to-day lives, 
are less likely to be depressed, and experience lower rates of phobia than younger 
people do” (Munsey, 2007). Additionally, older people tend to have fewer but more 
rewarding social contacts, which allows them to better control their emotional health 
(Berg et al., 2006).  
 
Other researchers of the elderly have reached similar conclusions. For instance, 
Argyle (2001) found evidence that happiness increases slightly with age, mainly due 
to a declining goal-achievement gap. In other words, as time goes by, individuals 
realise that their expectations were probably set too high in their younger years and 
learn to accept the reality of their lives. Likewise, Diener et al. (1999, p. 291) 
concluded that “life satisfaction often increases, or at least does not drop, with age”.  
 
In a related train of thought, the selection, optimisation and compensation (SOC) 
model attempts to highlight the factors that contribute to successful ageing and high 
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levels of well-being among the elderly (Baltes and Baltes, 1990). According to the 
SOC model, “successful aging encompasses selection of functional domains on 
which to focus one’s resources, optimizing developmental potential (maximization of 
gains) and compensating for losses – thus ensuring the maintenance of functioning 
and a minimization of losses” (Freund, 2002). One underlying assumption of this 
model is that internal and external resources are depleted as people age, often 
making it more difficult for individuals to shape their environment according to their 
goals. Selecting realistic goals becomes important, and empirical evidence shows 
that focusing on a selected few life domains “is particularly adaptive for those older 
people whose resources are highly constrained” (Freund, 2002).  
 
Broadly speaking, the gerontology literature on well-being in old age stresses the 
ability of older people to adapt to their circumstances. This adaptive capacity often 
declines among the very old, i.e. among the “oldest old” or those in the “fourth age” 
(Baltes and Smith, 2003), and accordingly, empirical evidence also suggests that 
there is a significant decline in well-being among the oldest old (Gwozdz and Sousa-
Poza, 2010). As technology today allows severe disability to be delayed to older 
ages, one can assume that this decline will, in subsequent generations, arise at an 
even higher age.   
 
   
2 Empirical evidence 
 
Authors in different fields have empirically analysed the relation between age and 
well-being and three main trends have been identified: a U-shape (convex), an 
inverted U-shape (concave) and linearity. In this section, we outline some of the most 
relevant literature supporting each of these positions. It should be stressed that the 
empirical studies that we are aware of do not, in essence, try to test the theories 
discussed above and it is most probably no trivial task trying to discriminate among 
the various theories.   
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U-Shaped Relation 
 
In recent years, a number of authors, especially economists, have identified a U-
shaped relation between age and reported life satisfaction. In these analyses, well-
being is believed to reach its minimum between a person’s mid-30s and early 50s 
(e.g. van Landeghem, 2012; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008). A number of reasons 
have been given for this observation, including: (i) the possibility that younger 
individuals have higher expectations than their elders that are not met; (ii) older 
individuals learn to adapt to their strengths and weaknesses and thus have more 
realistic aspirations; (iii) and happy people live longer. These reasons could all 
contribute to a reduction of well-being in younger years and an eventual increase as 
individuals age.  
 
One of the first attempts to examine this relation was Clark and Oswald’s (1994) 
study of a 1991 cross-section of the British Household Panel Survey and the General 
Health Questionnaire. The evidence indicates a U-shaped relation between both 
variables for both data sets, with a minimum life satisfaction reached around a 
person’s mid-30s. In a later study using the U.S. General Social Surveys, Oswald 
(1997) again found evidence of a U-shape with a minimum reached in the 30s.  
 
Frey and Stutzer (2002), in their meta-analysis of the economic quality-of-life 
literature, also concluded that a convex relation exists between life satisfaction and 
age, claiming that “the young and the old are happier than the middle-aged” (p. 54). 
In their study, after regressing happiness on age and controlling for other 
demographic factors like income, marital status, employment and health, they found 
that the minimum level of life satisfaction is reached between an individual’s 30th and 
35th year.  
 
Deaton (2007, 2008) explored cross-sectional data from the 2006 Gallup World Poll 
and showed that the age profiles of self-reported life satisfaction differ from country to 
country. Although his analysis is descriptive and  does not control for covariates, the 
use of the World Gallup Poll data allowed for cross-country comparisons and 
encompassed nationally representative samples of individuals from over 130 
countries. By observing general life satisfaction among individuals from different age 
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groups, Deaton (2008) concluded that the U-shaped relation is present solely in rich, 
English-speaking countries in which the elderly are relatively satisfied with their lives. 
In his words, “for most of the world, life satisfaction declines with age; the exceptions 
being among the very highest-income countries – including the United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand – where life satisfaction is U-
shaped with age, falling at first and rising after middle age” (ibid., p. 8).  
 
Although a broad body of literature supports the existence of a U-shaped relation, 
most such analyses are based exclusively on cross-sectional data. For example, Di 
Tella et al. (2001) used multiple regressions and cross-sections to confirm the U-
shaped relation between age and reported well-being in developed countries. 
However, the problem with cross-sectional analyses is that the convex relationship 
might be due to omitted cohort effects in the variable that measures age. That is, a 
generation born in particularly difficult or prosperous times might report levels of life 
satisfaction that are lower or higher than the levels reported by other generations.  
 
To counteract this criticism, researchers have tried to analyse the robustness of the 
U-shape in a longitudinal design using such longitudinal data sets as the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (since 1984) and the British Household Panel Survey (since 
1991). In their 2006 study, Clark and Oswald tested the validity of the U-shaped 
relation using longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey and the 
British General Health Questionnaire. Their data sets ranged from 1991 to 2004 and 
covered over 100,000 individuals. After using fixed effects to control for individual 
heterogeneity, the authors confirmed the U-shaped relation between reported well-
being and age with one difference from their previous findings in that minimum life 
satisfaction occurred in the mid-40s, not the mid-30s. Even after controlling for 
myriad variables they found consistent evidence for the U-shape, with a minimum 
reached between 40 and 49 years of age. 
 
To determine whether this U-shaped relation reflects individuals’ reactions to typical 
events in the lifecycle or is due to unobserved cohort effects, Clark (2007) controlled 
for cohort effects using fixed-effects estimations in panel regressions on 14 waves of 
the British Household Panel Survey. Estimation with fixed effects still gave rise to a 
U-shape, although the curviture was not as pronounced.  
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Using panel data from 1996-2000 and 2002-2004 from the British Household Panel, 
a more recent study by McAdams et al. (2012) used an innovative approach that 
analyses eight individual domains of life satisfaction: health, income, housing, 
partnership, job, social life, amount of leisure time, and use of leisure time. Age 
trajectories diverged considerably across these domains, but in general, satisfaction 
with social life, housing, amount of leisure time and use of leisure time showed a U-
shape pattern with age. When aggregating all eight domains, a pattern resembling 
the U-shape of overall life satisfaction also emerged. The authors concluded that 
“this pattern is consistent with the idea that people are constructing overall evaluative 
judgements in a more bottom-up fashion” (McAdams, 2012, p. 301).  
 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) tested the robustness of the U-shape using a set of 
dummy variables for each birth decade to account for cohort effects in a sample of 
over 500,000 individuals in America (U.S. General Social Surveys, 1972–2006) and 
Europe (Eurobarometer Surveys, 1976–2002; UK Labour Force Survey, 2004–2007). 
Although the authors controlled for such demographic and economic variables as 
marital status, race, children, education level and employment status, they could not 
control for health. They did however test whether the data had a quadratic form in 
age and concluded that the U-shaped relation between age and reported life 
satisfaction holds despite the inclusion of cohort effects. In the United States, when 
cohort effects were not taken into account, males reach their minimum life 
satisfaction at 35.7 years of age, but once cohort effects were controlled for, this 
minimum moved forward to 52.9. Women, on the other hand, reached a minimum at 
38.6 even when cohort effects are accounted for. In Europe, well-being reached a 
minimum at 44.5 without cohort effects and at 46.5 with cohort effects. Blanchflower 
and Oswald also examined the relation between age and well-being (proxied by 
mental health) using only the UK Labour Force Survey and showed that depression 
and anxiety reaches a maximum around age 46, which is consistent with previously 
reported results.  
 
When testing the robustness of the U-shape in developing countries, Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2008) found evidence that the curvilinear relationship seems to partially 
hold there as well. Using four waves of the World Values Survey, the 
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Latinobarometers, and the Asiabarometers, they followed a similar methodology to 
that used for the American and European data. In addition to controlling for 
employment status, marital status, years of education and income, the authors used 
dummies for countries and years. They found that “the U-shape seems to occur in 
the majority of nations,” which in their analysis totalled 72, but not in 20 developing 
countries, an outcome whose insignificance they attributed to the small sample sizes 
(ibid., p. 13). 
 
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (1985–2007), Van Landeghem 
(2008, 2012) examined the validity of the U-shaped relation from the perspective of 
different econometric methods with special attention to model specification problems. 
First, he used pooled OLS with and without controls and found that without controls, 
well-being reaches a minimum between 42 and 52 years of age, whereas with 
controls, the minimum is reached later, around the age of 60. His data also illustrated 
a second turning point in life, around age 70, a finding consistent with Gwodz and 
Sousa-Poza (2010) in Van Landeghem (2012), in which he aimed to identify the 
second derivative of well-being with respect to age. This study shows positive second 
derivative until midlife, which implies convexity and is thus in line with a U-shaped 
pattern.  
 
Three recent studies have used “non-subjective” data to assess the U-shape relation, 
namely Blanchflower and Oswald (2011), Lang et al. (2011), and Weiss et al. (2012). 
The use of such data can be seen as “a powerful and independent corroboration of 
the claim in the well-being literature that happiness and mental health follow an 
approximate U-shape through life” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2011).   
 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2011) used data from the 2010 Eurobarometer survey in 
order to analyse the effect of age on the probability of taking antidepressants. With a 
sample of over 16,000 individuals in 27 countries, the study shows that the 
probability of taking antidepressants follows an inverted U-shape pattern with a peak 
the late 40s. “People in their mid-life are approximately twice as likely to be taking 
antidepressants as individuals with the same characteristics who are under the age 
of 25 or over the age of 65” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2011, p. 15). This result is 
consistent with a U-shape pattern of (mental) well-being and age. 
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Lang et al. (2011) analysed pooled data from the Health Survey for England collected 
between 1997 and 2006. With a sample of approximately 100,000 individuals, they 
assessed the prevalence of diagnosed mental illness and receipt of prescribed 
psychiatric medication. Diagnoses, treatments and prevalence of psychological 
distress rose with age until early middle age and declined subsequently. This result 
is, however, specific to low-income groups.  
 
A recent study by Weiss et al. (2012) analysed the well-being of a sample of 508 
great apes housed in zoos, sanctuaries and research centers in four countries. The 
well-being of the apes was reported by zoo keepers, volunteers, researchers, and 
caretakers who had known the apes for at least two years. Well-being was assessed 
using a 4-item questionnaire on a 7-point scale. The results support a U-shape 
relation with minumums at around 30 years of age, comparable to human well-being 
minima of approximately 45-50 years. This result is particularly interesting as it 
highlights the possibility that “the U-shape found in human studies of age and well-
being evolved in the common ancestors of humans and nonhuman primates” (Weiss 
et al., 2012, p. 2).  
 
Inverted U-Relation 
 
Contrary to the U-shape, very limited evidence on an inverted U-shape exists. 
Mroczek and Spiro (2005) included only males between 40 and 85 years of age in 
their analysis of data from the Veterans Affairs Normative Ageing Study, one of the 
first panel analyses (22 waves) to explore the relation between ageing and reported 
well-being measured by positive affect. Their results show an inverted U-shaped 
relation between age and positive affect in which well-being grows throughout midlife 
and peaks around age 65. Thereafter, it falls steadily. They also concluded that one 
year before death, reported positive affect decreases dramatically. It must be 
stressed, however, that this pattern is consistent with the U-shaped relation that 
reaches a maximum at around 65 years.  
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One of the most influential studies in support of an inverted U-shape is Easterlin’s 
(2006b) investigation of a possible lifecycle pattern of well-being in the United States 
and the factors responsible for it. Using data from the United States General Social 
Surveys (1973–1994), he applied a “domains of life approach” to analyse the 
variables happiness, financial satisfaction, job satisfaction, family satisfaction and 
health satisfaction. After regressing happiness on age while controlling for birth 
cohort, gender, race and education, Easterlin concluded that “happiness is greatest 
at midlife, but not by a great deal. On average, it rises as people progress from 18 to 
51 and declines thereafter” (ibid., p. 471).  
 
Easterlin and Sawangfa (2007) developed this hypothesis further using the same 
panel data for the United States and regressing happiness on age while controlling 
for socio-demographics like year of birth, gender, race and education level. Their 
results confirm a slightly inverse U-shaped relation between happiness and age, with 
maximum happiness being reached around the 50th year of life. The variation, 
however, is very small: the scale of the happiness variable is 1 to 3, and the actual 
variation is of only one decimal point. The authors therefore concluded that 
“happiness is fairly constant over time” (ibid., p. 1). 
 
 
Linear Relation 
 
A linear relation between reported well-being and age has also been observed, 
though it can be constant throughout the lifecycle or sloping upward or downward. 
Costa et al.’s (1987) 9-year longitudinal study based on data from the National Health 
and Nutrition Examination Survey is one study that confirms this viewpoint. Using 
diverse multivariate regressions, both cross- and time sequential, on data from 
individuals aged between 25 and 74, these authors found no significant age, cohort 
or time effects on reported well-being in any of their analyses. They concluded that 
“the present data provide compelling evidence for the stability of levels of well-being 
in adulthood” (ibid., p. 55).  
 
18 
 
In their meta-analysis of (primarily psychological) empirical studies on happiness, 
Myers and Diener (1995) also reached the conclusion that there is an even 
distribution of reported well-being over age. According to their review, life satisfaction 
does not seem to depend significantly on outside circumstances but rather is based 
on personality traits and positive and negative affects that are usually time invariant. 
They thus defended the claim that “no time in life is notably happiest or unhappier 
than others” (ibid., p.11). 
 
All these studies, by arguing in favour of relatively constant well-being throughout the 
lifecycle, seem to support the psychological set-point theory of life satisfaction. 
Nonetheless, other empirical studies have delivered contradictory results. Deaton 
(2008), for example, in his analysis of 2006 World Gallup Poll data, concluded that 
outcomes for the relation between age and life satisfaction differ across countries. 
His results indicate that life satisfaction declines with age in middle income and 
transition countries, where health satisfaction seems to be affected more negatively 
by age than in richer countries. He thus concluded that “for most of the world, life 
satisfaction declines with age” (ibid., p. 8), and that this decrease is stronger in 
middle-income countries and the strongest in former Soviet countries, where the 
elderly seem to be the most dissatisfied age group of all. In low-income countries, the 
decline in life satisfaction with age is not as strong. He attributed these differences 
specifically to cohort effects. 
 
Similar conclusions were reached by Carmel (2001, 2011) and her team, who 
conducted four large-scale empirical studies to test the hypothesis that the will to live 
is a reliable indicator for life satisfaction among the elderly. All these studies, two 
using cross sections and two using longitudinal data, were based on information on 
the elderly in Israel. The researchers assessed the will to live using both single and 
multiple item scales. The single-item results confirm a strong correlation between the 
will to live and diverse indicators of well-being such as self-esteem, happiness, life 
satisfaction, health and physical functioning, and this association is supported by the 
multiple item outcomes. The will to live was significantly but negatively correlated 
with age, indicating that it diminishes as age increases. 
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Similarly, as discussed previously, when Van Landeghem (2008) attempted to 
corroborate the validity of the U-shaped relation between age and life satisfaction 
using German Socio-Economic Panel Data, he found the results highly sensitive to 
model specification problems. When he used pooled OLS, the U-shape held, but 
when he controlled cohort effects with fixed-effects estimation, the U-shape 
disappeared and the curves sloped upward with age. He thus concluded that “the U-
shape is less supported in a longitudinal setting, and that the shape of the effect of 
ageing on subjective well-being seems to be sensitive to the specification […] 
suggesting the importance of time-varying as well as time-invariant factors to 
determine life satisfaction” (ibid., pp. 3, 15). Using data from longitudinal surveys (the 
British Household Panel, the German Socio-Economic Panel, and the “Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia” Survey), two recent studies by Frijters 
and Beatton (2012) and Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2012) show that the 
use of fixed-effects models causes the U-shape to disappear.  
 
 
Gwozdz and Sousa-Poza (2010) reached very similar conclusions in their analysis of 
13 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel Data (1994–2007). In this study, 
using the methodology proposed by Clark (2007), they estimated a fixed-effects 
model to control for cohort effects while also controlling for other socio-demographic 
variables such as marital status, number of children, employment status and 
education. After first estimating two cross-sectional models, one with and one without 
controls, they compared these outcomes to those of a longitudinal model that 
accounts for individual heterogeneity using fixed effects. Their results show that 
when the estimation is based on pooled regressions, most age dummies are 
significant and produce a U-shape. Only after the age of 75 does life satisfaction 
seem to rapidly decrease, reaching the lowest level at the oldest ages. When the 
estimation uses fixed effects, however, the U-shape vanishes. Again, only among the 
oldest old (after 85 years), does there seem to be a pure age effect that causes life 
satisfaction to decrease steeply. The authors thus concluded that, at least in 
Germany, the U-shape is likely to be caused by cohort effects or unobserved 
individual characteristics that are constant over time.  
 
Offering another angle, Stone et al. (2010)  analysed hedonic well-being in the United 
States with more than 300,000 observations from the 2008 Gallop Poll. As opposed 
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to global well-being, which assesses an overall judgement of one’s life, hedonic well-
being captures affective components of well-being such as the experience of 
happiness or stress. Such hedonic measures “may yield a different view of aging 
because it is less influenced by the cognitive reconstruction inherent in global well-
being measures and because it includes both positive and negative components of 
well-being” (Stone et al., 2010, p. 9985). Their analysis shows that, although global 
as well as positive hedonic well-being is U-shaped, negative hedonic well-being is 
not. Feelings of stress and anger decline with age, feelings of worry are elevated 
through middle age and then decline, and feelings of sadness are in essence flat.  
 
 
3 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper has been to review the literature on the relation between 
subjective well-being and ageing; that is, how subjective well-being evolves across 
the lifespan. An overview of the empirical studies on this topic discussed above is 
also given in the appendix. As our review has indicated, drawing general conclusions 
is difficult as papers use different data sets, methodologies and samples. 
Nevertheless, we offer several general observations. 
 
Cohort effects – because they refer to data trends that arise because individuals 
were born at a particular point in time under particular circumstances that differ from 
those of individuals born at different times – do seem to matter. In fact, observations 
suggest that even though well-being could be constant over the lifecycle, “people 
born in different years report, on average, a different level of life satisfaction […] or 
two cohorts might be equally happy but still report a different value of life satisfaction” 
(Schilling, 2005, p. 4). For example, an individual born in Germany during the first 
half of the twentieth century, who lived through the hardships of the Great 
Depression and the two World Wars, could feel that the second half of the century, 
with its economic and social progress, was much better (ibid.). This individual, 
therefore, would report much higher life satisfaction than individuals born after the 
1950s. Accounting for cohort effects, therefore, allows researchers to eliminate time 
or period differences and deliver a “pure” ageing effect, if one exists. Such cohort 
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effects, however, cannot be effectively controlled in cross-sectional analyses and 
require longitudinal data and additional assumptions (Van Landeghem, 2012). Yet 
several studies on this topic reviewed here are based on cross-sections.  
 
Selection of control variables, a decision that in turn depends on the underlying 
research objective, is also very important. Are we, for example, interested in the 
general trend of life satisfaction across the lifespan or do we want to assess the 
“pure” age effect – one that, all other explanatory variables kept constant, would 
explain the U-shape as a reflection of “the passage of individuals through various 
stylized life events” (Clark 2007, p. 3). If this “pure” age effect is to be isolated, health 
or physical vitality must be controlled for. Yet, data on health or physical vitality are 
not always readily available, and most studies fail to adequately account for these 
variables. Easterlin (2006b, p. 465) deliberately avoids controlling for health on the 
grounds that “if one wants to know whether a person is likely to be happier in his or 
her golden years than when forming families, one would not want to set aside the fact 
that older people are likely to have lower income, and be less healthy, and are more 
likely to be living alone”. Nonetheless, no matter how interesting it might be to 
examine how life satisfaction changes throughout the lifespan, doing so allows no 
conclusions to be drawn about the effect of age alone (see also Glenn, 2009 and 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2009).  
 
In general, it is difficult to say with certainty whether the relationship between age 
and well-being across the lifespan is linear or convex. Given that theory and empirics 
in all disciplines seem to argue against an inverted U-shaped relation, the concavity 
hypothesis can most likely be dismissed. In fact, van Landeghem (2012) specifically 
concluded that, at least for Germany, “one can exclude the concavely upward sloping 
pattern” (p. 579), and even Easterlin (2006b), who presented the strongest evidence 
in favour of an inverse U-relation, admitted that “happiness is greatest at midlife, but 
not by a great deal” (p. 471). However, in general, one must stress that the functional 
relationships identified in the empirical studies are prima facie incompatible. In a 
recent study, Frijters and Beatton (2012) shed some light on this issue by analysing 
different functional forms with data from three large panel data sets from Germany, 
Australia and Britain (namely with data from the GSOEP, HILDA and BHPS). The 
study shows that the age-happiness profile is U-shaped when including socio-
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economic control variables, but that this relationship disappears when using fixed-
effects methods that also control for unobserved individual characteristics, a result 
also observed in Gwozdz and Sousa-Poza (2010) and Kassenboehmer and Haisken-
DeNew (2012). The authors argue that this is due to reverse causality, i.e. 
“happiness-increasing variables, like getting a job, a high income, and getting 
married, appear to happen mostly to middle-aged individuals who were already 
happy. In all three data sets, this reverse causality shows up in cross-sections as 
inflated coefficients for income, marriage, and getting a job. In order to fit the actual 
age profile of happiness, the bias in coefficients for socio-economic variables forces 
the predicted age profile to become U-shaped. When one controls for fixed-effects, 
the non-linearity all but disappears for all three data sets” (Frijters and Beatton, 2012, 
p. 540). 
 
But it is not only the choice of control variables and estimation techniques that matter 
– the different measures of subjective well-being also play a role. This is quite clearly 
shown in the Stone et al. (2010) study that reveals different patterns depending on 
whether a global measure of well-being, a positive hedonic well-being measure or a 
negative hedonic well-being measure (such as “worry” or “sadness”) is used. Recent 
use of more “objective” measures of subjective well-being, such as use of 
antidepressants (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2011) or reports of apes’ well-being by 
their keepers (Weiss et al., 2012), tend to support the U-shape. 
 
Besides being statistically significant, is any observed U-shape also relevant? Or in 
other words, how large is the age effect? Typically, the maximum variation in life 
satisfaction (i.e. the difference in life satisfaction between the young and the middle-
aged) is about 0.5 on a 7-point scale. One could thus conclude that the age effect on 
subjective well-being is rather small. It should, however, be noted that the standard 
error of life satisfaction is also usually not large, and that the difference in well-being 
between the top and bottom of the curve is about one fifth to one third of the standard 
deviation of life satisfaction scores. The magnitude of the age effect is comparable 
with medium-term effects of major life events such as becoming unemployed or 
becoming disabled. This magnitude, as pointed out by Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2008, p. 1741), “is suggestive of a large effect on well-being.” 
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Our survey of the literature shows that, despite the numerous recent papers 
published on this topic, controversy regarding the effect that ageing has on life 
satisfaction still exists. We believe that a fruitful avenue for future research is to focus 
on less subjective measures of well-being in order to see how these measures 
corroborate those using more traditional well-being measures. Studies such as Weiss 
et al. (2012) have the potential to significantly increase our understanding of this 
topic. Use of longer panels may also shed additional insights, as mentioned by 
Frijters and Beatton (2012, p. 529), who said that ideally one would want to “follow 
representative individuals throughout their whole life, starting at birth.” Such data is 
not readily available, but do exist (such as the British National Child Development 
Study and the British Cohort Study). We also believe that the domain approach taken 
by, for example, McAdams et al. (2012), can shed more light on explaining age-
satisfaction trajectories, and we are not aware of many studies that take such an 
approach. In general, little empirical evidence exists that actually tests individual 
theories, implying that explanations of age-satisfaction trajectories remain somewhat 
speculative. Finally, a focus on countries outside of Europe and North America could 
also be valuable in assessing the extent to which results can be generalized. This 
point applies in particular to studies based on panel data, for which little evidence 
outside of Europe or the United States exists.   
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5 Appendix 
Study  Data  Cross-
sectional (CS) / 
longitudinal 
(L) 
Controls  Selected highlights  
Literature surveys 
Myers and Diener  
1996  
   No time in life is notably happiest or most 
satisfying. 
Happiness does not appear to depend 
significantly on outside circumstances.  
Frey and Stutzer 
2002  
   Age affects happiness in a U-shaped way. 
Young and old people are happier than middle-
aged people. 
The least happy people are between 30 and 35 
years old.  
Studies with evidence for U-shape 
Clark and Oswald  
1994, 2006  
British Household Panel 
Survey and General Health 
Questionnaire  
L YES Clear evidence of a U-shape.  
Minimum life satisfaction reached in the band 
between 40 to 49 years.  
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Clark  
2007  
British Household Panel 
Survey  
L YES Confirms U-shaped relation after controlling for 
cohort effects. 
Blanchflower and Oswald  
2008  
US General Social 
Surveys, Eurobarometer, 
UK Labour Force Survey, 
World Values Survey, 
Latinobarometer, 
Asiabarometer  
CS YES Well defined U-shape in age. 
Well-being in the U.S. reaches its minimum for 
men in the early 50s, for women in the late 30s. 
In Europe, life satisfaction for both men and 
women minimises in the mid 40s. 
Van Landegham 
2008, 2012  
German Socio-Economic 
Panel  1985-2007  
L YES U-shape in age. 
Minimum life satisfaction between 42 and 52 
years. 
U-shape vanishes after controlling for 
individuals fixed effects.  
Blanchflower and Oswald  
2011 
Eurobarometer 2010 CS YES Inverted U-shape relation between the 
probability of taking antidepressants and age. 
Lang et al.  
2011 
Health Survey for England 
1997-2006 
CS YES Prevalence of psychological distress, diagnoses 
and treatments rise with age until early middle 
age and then declined subsequently in low-
income groups. 
McAdams et al.  
2012 
British Household Panel 
1996-2000 and 2002-2004 
L NO Analyses eight individual domains of life 
satisfaction.  
Age trajectories diverge considerably across 
these domains.  
When aggregating all eight domains, a pattern 
resembling the U-shape of overall life 
satisfaction emerges. 
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Weiss et al.  
2012  
Sample of caretakers’ 
evaluation of great apes’ 
well-being in 4 countries  
CS NO U-shape relation between well-being and age can 
be observed. 
Studies with evidence for linear relation or inverted U-shape 
Costa et al.  
1987  
National Health and 
Nutrition Examination 
Survey  
L YES Total well-being shows no significant age, birth 
cohort or time effects in any of the analyses. 
Strong evidence of the stability of mean levels of 
psychological well-being in adulthood. 
Mroczek and Spiro 
2005  
Veterans Affairs 
Normative Aging Study  
L YES Inverted U-shaped relation between age in life 
satisfaction. 
Life satisfaction peaks around 65 years. 
One year before death, life satisfaction 
dramatically decreases. 
Easterlin  
2006b  
US General Social Surveys        
1973–1994  
L YES Happiness increases in midlife, but “not by a 
great deal”. 
Highest life satisfaction at age 51.  
Easterlin and Sawangfa 
2007 
US General Social Surveys        
1973–1994  
L YES Shows an inverted U-shape. 
Effect of age on individual domains of life 
satisfaction are analysed. 
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Deaton  
2007  
2006 World Gallup Poll 
(132 countries)  
CS NO Age-profile of life satisfaction differs among 
countries. 
There seems to be a U-shaped relation only 
among rich English-speaking countries. 
Gwozdz and  
Sousa–Poza  
2010  
German Socio-Economic 
Panel  1994–2006  
 
L YES Estimating pooled regressions, most age 
dummies are significant and produce a U-shape.  
Using fixed effects estimation, the U-shape 
vanishes. 
Strong decline in satisfaction among the oldest 
old.  
Stone et al.  
2010  
Gallup Poll 2008 
 
CS YES Although global as well as positive hedonic 
well-being is U-shaped, negative hedonic well-
being is not.  
Feelings of stress and anger decline with age, 
feelings of worry are elevated through middle 
age and then decline, and feelings of sadness are 
in essence flat. 
Carmel  
2011  
Four data sets on elderly 
Israelis  
CS YES Willingness to live can be used as a proxy for 
life satisfaction. 
Willingness to live declines with age.  
Kassenboehmer and 
Haisken-DeNew  
2012  
German Socio-Economic 
Panel  1994–2006  
 
L YES The U-shape effect on life satisfaction in pooled 
OLS regressions is refuted when controlling for 
fixed effects and respondent experience in the 
panel. 
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Frijters and Beatton 
2012  
German Socio-Economic 
Panel, British Household 
Panel Survey, Household 
Income Labour Dynamics 
Australia. 
 
L YES The weak U-shape in middle age becomes more 
pronounced when allowing for socio-economic 
variables.  
When selection effects via fixed-effects are 
accounted for, the dominant age-effect in all 
three panels is a strong happiness increase 
around the age of 60 followed by a major decline 
after 75, with the U-shape in middle age 
disappearing. 
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